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## BOOK REVIEWS

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE PRINCIPLE AND THE PRACTICE, edited by Stephen Pierce Duggan. (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1919, illustrated, 370 pages.)

This is a symposium by sixteen writers of national repute under the editorial supervision of the Director of the Institute of International Education. It is divided into three parts, Part I dealing with the "History, Philosophy, and Organization of a League of Nations," Part II with "International Coöperation, as Applied to Concrete Problems," and Part III with "America and the League of Nations." There are Appendices, which include the text of the League Covenant, extracts from documents and treatises of historical interest, and an excellent bibliography by Professor Lindsay Rogers.

It is significant that the title is "*The* League of Nations" instead of "*A* League of Nations." The splendid works of Brailsford and others, written before the Peace Conference, dealt with what a league *ought* to be. This book deals with the League as it *is*. Many of the topics discussed in its pages have been treated before, but it is the distinct merit of this symposium that it orientates all of these questions around the proposals or omissions of the Paris Covenant rather than the abstract idea of a league.

I mention the omissions of the Covenant. Several important chapters, such as those on economic internationalism and the freedom of the seas, have very little to say of the Covenant, not because of a tendency to abstract reasoning, but because the League charter is either weak or silent on some very vital issues. A thoughtful reading of the volume convinces one that, if the League proves a failure, it will be as much because of its omissions as because of its positive defects. This is not, however, as serious a criticism of its authors as it might at first seem. For another fact which is clearly brought out by this book is the almost hopeless complexity of the problem of peace. "The legalist," says Mr. Glenn Frank in Chapter X, "is prone to over-simplify both the problems and the solution \* \* \*. But keeping the peace, even in a municipality, is not the negative and narrow task it is too frequently assumed to be. It is not the municipal court, the policeman and the probation officer that hold the community together. The fact is that it is the administration of health, of education, of trade and the various local functions required by common necessity that unify and stabilize the local community. And this is literally and in detail true of the international situation." (p. 190). The whole tendency of the book is to confirm this statement.

Mr. Frank urges that political association should be accompanied by economic partnership. From another point of view Professor John Bassett Moore, in his chapter on "Some Essentials of a League of Peace," emphasizes the necessity of the will to peace. He says: "While, for the preservation of peace, all devices such as international con-

ferences, arbitration, mediation and good offices are or may be useful, according to the circumstances of the case, back of all this we must, in the last analysis, rely upon the cultivation of a mental attitude which will lead men to think first of amicable processes rather than of war, when differences arise." (p. 81). But perhaps even the psychology of peace rests on an economic basis—the economic interdependence of states. It is fundamentally this interdependence that will make a new international order possible.

What will be the political philosophy of this new order? Among present-day radicals, the guild-socialists and the syndicalists are attacking the state from one side and the internationalists from the other. All claim that their proposals, if adopted, will make for world peace. But Professor Lindsay Rogers, in his able plea for a new state philosophy, discards these extremes: "Without attacking the internal sovereignty of the state, without advocating a divided allegiance—whether between the state and a group or the state and humanity—it will be possible to develop a common will which will make possible a federation of the world." But this must come through the abandonment of national egoism in democratic states whose basis is "not force, but the dedication of its citizens to advance the welfare of one another." (p. 95.)

The book possesses a characteristic common to all symposiums: it has no one central theme, but a number of themes; and the conclusions of different chapters are sometimes at variance. An example of this is seen by comparing Chapters VIII and XII. In the former, Professor Sayre says of the Suez Commission created in 1888 that "it is interesting chiefly as an illustration of the fact that no national or international commission can succeed so long as it is accorded only sham power;" while he considers the Sugar Commission "especially interesting because it proves the possibility of the exercise of an effective control by an international body, even in such difficult and delicate matters as the adjustment of foreign tariffs, when the Commission is properly constituted and clothed with adequate power." (pp. 155 and 158). In the latter, Mr. Joseph P. Chamberlain points out that in the Postal and Telegraph Unions "no arbitration court has been needed, no international commission to enforce the treaties.\* \* \* An international administrative authority, interfering with local officials, with local laws and courts, should be condemned as more likely to cause than to prevent conflict. No great state will long tolerate it \* \* \*. If they (commissions) are established in the smaller states, the result will be constant intriguing to be rid of them. In organizing the world to be, statesmen will do well to remember that on the other side of the channel from the rocks of exclusive state sovereignty, lies the whirlpool of intrigue involved in international administration, with the governments moving their puppet representatives in accordance with understandings which will culminate in tacit alliances. Only by steering the safe middle course of arbitration can both dangers to our civilization be avoided." (pp. 235 and 236). The conclusions of Messrs. Cotton and Morrow, who were personally connected with "The Ma-

chinery of International Coöperation during the Great War," appear to verify the latter opinion. "It is in its reliance," they claim, "on the value of the international understanding to prevent disagreement, and its significant omission of anything like an international police force which would attempt to coerce agreement, that the proposed covenant gives most promise of success. That was the chief lesson of international coöperation during the war. And it is hardly to be expected that the nations of the world at peace will find the problem of international action easier of solution than the nations fighting against Germany found it during the war." (p. 63). I quote these differences, not by way of criticism, but to show the value of hearing both sides of the question.

Other points of especial interest are: Professor Moore's keenly analytical criticism of "preponderant force as a deterrent;" President Lowell's classification of the proposed League as an "automatic" as opposed to the "delegated" type of League; and Professor Barnes' claim that small national states will be advantageous under an effective league. "Merely to bring into being a large number of small nations would," he admits, "not only reverse the natural course of political evolution, but would invite the certain recrudescence of a warfare like that which accompanied the nationalistic upheavals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rendered all the more horrible by the fatal effectiveness of the modern engines of war and destruction." (p. 174). On the other hand, he thinks that "by creating a stable international organization, comprising a large number of politically autonomous nations, not only will there be provided a larger juridical aggregate than the world has ever before witnessed, but there will be secured that orderly and natural development, differentiation and coördination of parts which seem but essential accompaniments of the evolution of political as well as social organisms." (p. 175). It must be admitted that this reference to Spencer's definition of evolution is quite striking; yet its effect is weakened by the very next sentence: "And all of this would be achieved by the peaceful legislative act of man, and would escape the tardy and expensive method of natural evolution through the application of force." Is not the idea of evolution here abandoned through the use of the legalist's fallacy discussed above?

The chapter on "The United States and the Policy of Isolation," by Professor Henry F. Munro, though well written, is of less intense interest than it would have been a year ago. Our chief executive has already discarded the policy in practice; and I think it safe to say that the American people are now reconciled to its abandonment in proportion to the degree of effectiveness promised by the League. On the other hand, that the question of the Monroe Doctrine is still a vital matter is shown by the very important problems discussed in the last chapter. The main questions that Professor Kimball raises there are: What does the Doctrine as referred to in the Covenant mean? Is it the imperialistic or the liberal meaning that is reserved in Article XXI? Do the other countries mean the same thing by it that we do? Is the reservation consistent with other provisions of the

Covenant? It is pointed out that the adoption of the imperialistic interpretation is inconsistent with permanent peace, especially since it would allow imperialistic action by other nations under the phrase "regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine." The other interpretation would mean an analogy to the mandatory system, provided these regional understandings are kept within the spirit of Article X.

Limited space does not allow a detailed summary of each chapter, and even if it did, that would not be of any particular value. The most that can be done here is to indicate some of the problems of peace that the book presents. Enough has been said to show that, despite one or two errors of fact, and a few doubtful opinions, this work is of great help to one trying to pass intelligent judgment on the value of the Covenant. Even aside from the opinions expressed, the very fact of a clear presentation of the nature of the problems is of inestimable service in clearing the air of the effusions of petty politicians, whether they advocate or denounce the league.

S. JAMES HART.